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W states of multipartite systems are pair-wisely entangled, belonging to a different class from
Greenberger, Horne, and Zeilinger states. Based on W states, we propose three variant protocols for
quantum secure communication, i.e., quantum key distribution, partial quantum secret sharing, and
their synthesis. By the synthesis we mean that both quantum key distribution and partial quantum
secret sharing are executed in a single protocol. For these protocols it is discussed how authorized
communicators detect individual attacks by an eavesdropper.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum entanglement is at the heart of quantum
information processes. In particular bipartite entangle-
ment has been extensively studied for quantum key dis-
tribution [1], teleportation [2], entanglement swapping
[3], entanglement teleportation [4], conclusive teleporta-
tion [5], and quantum computation [6]. On the other
hand multipartite entanglement has been relatively less
studied in terms of information-theoretic aspects.
Recently the classification on the states of three qubits
has been proposed [7, 8, 9]. A typical class includes
Greenberger- Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states which exhibit
nonlocality among distant local observables [10] and have
nonvanishing tangle [11]. W states are pair-wisely en-
tangled with no tangle and they belong to the differ-
ent class from GHZ states in the sense that they can
not be transformed to any GHZ states under the lo-
cal operation and classical communication (LOCC) [12].
These facts suggest that W states have the physical
properties considerably different from GHZ states. W
states have been rarely considered for quantum informa-
tion protocols, whereas GHZ states have been employed
for quantum cryptography among several distant parts
[13, 14, 15].
The nonlocality of W states were studied by explicitly
considering non-commuting observables [16]. The gener-
ation of W states has been investigated with the physical
models based on linear optical elements [17], cavity QED
[18], and Heisenberg XY model [19].
In this paper we propose three variant protocols by
using W states of three qubits which enable the quan-
tum secure communication among three distant persons.
The protocols include quantum key distribution (QKD)
in the pair-wise way and partial quantum secret sharing
(PQSS) among the three persons. In addition we propose
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a synthesis protocol by which both pair-wise QKD and
PQSS are executed simultaneously when it is necessary.
It is discussed how authorized communicators detect in-
dividual attacks by an eavesdropper.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF W STATES
We consider briefly the known characteristics on W
states of three qubits and compare them with those of
GHZ states. W states can not be transformed to the GHZ
state under LOCC, implying they belong to a different
class from the GHZ states [12].
A pure triseparable state of three qubits is defined by
Schmidt-like decomposition as [20]
|φ3〉 =
2∑
i=1
λi|αi, βi, γi〉 (1)
where {|αi〉}, {|βi〉} and {|γi〉} are orthonormal basis
sets on the Hilbert spaces for the three qubits, respec-
tively, and λi are positive. The triseparability is closely
related to the tangle τ = 2λ1λ2 [11]. When λi = 1/
√
2,
the triseparable state (1) becomes a maximal GHZ state
with τ = 1. When the partial trace is performed over one
qubit, the reduced density operator of the other qubits
can be represented by a convex sum of product states.
It implies that the reduced density operator is separa-
ble. On the other hand, it can be shown by generalized
Schmidt decomposition scheme [8] that W states are not
triseparable since they can not be represented in the form
of Eq. (1). Thus W states have no tangle, τ = 0. But
the reduced density operator for each pair among the
three qubits is inseparable because its partial transposi-
tion has at least one negative eigenvalue. Thus, the W
state is pair-wisely entangled with no tangle.
The nonlocality of W states can be revealed by three
local observers. Let zq and xq be the outcomes (+ or
−) in measuring σˆz and σˆx on qubit q (q = A,B,C).
For the W state the local observables zq and xq satisfy
2Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) criterion of elements of
reality and should be predetermined before any measure-
ment [21]. However, such a predetermination is impossi-
ble according to quantum mechanics. Recently, Cabello
[16] has shown that quantum mechanics refutes EPR’s
elements of reality by the proof similar to the GHZ’s. It
is notable that the refutation results from the inferences
by only two of three qubits while the inferences by all
three qubits are necessary for GHZ’s.
Bell’s theorem for W states of three qubits can be in-
vestigated also by considering Clauser-Horne-Bell (CH-
Bell) inequality [16],
−1 ≤ A11 −A12 −A21 −A22 ≤ 0, (2)
where A11 = P (z
i = z+, z
j = z+) is the probability that
two qubits i and j among the three raise the outcomes
of z+ as they are measured by σˆz , and A12 = P (z
i =
z+, x
j 6= xk) is the probability that one qubit i measured
by σˆz raises the outcome of z+ and the others j and k
measured in σˆx raise the outcomes opposite to each other.
Similarly, A21 = P (x
i 6= xk, zj = z+), and A22 = P (xi =
xj = xk).
In particular consider a symmetric W state [11],
|W 〉 = 1√
3
(|z−z+z+〉+ |z+z−z+〉+ |z+z+z−〉) , (3)
where {|z+〉, |z−〉} is the set of the eigen states for σˆz and
the symbol “⊗” for the direct product is omitted unless
any confusions arise. For this symmetric W state (3),
P (zi = z+, z
j = z+) = 1, (4)
P (zi = z+, x
j 6= xk) = 0, (5)
P (xi 6= xk, zj = z+) = 0, (6)
P (xi = xj = xk) = 3/4. (7)
The middle term in Eq. (2) is 1/4, implying the violation
of the CH-Bell inequality (2).
III. QUANTUM SECURE COMMUNICATION
VIA W STATES
A. Pair-wise quantum key distribution
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a secure commu-
nication scheme by which two distant persons have in
common a secret key message via quantum channels and
classical communication. A QKD protocol includes three
basic steps: a) Encoding a key message on a quantum
state, b) transmitting the quantum system in the en-
coded state, and c) decoding the key message from the
state. Protocols for QKD may be divided into two sets:
protocols assisted by an entangled quantum channel and
the rest of protocols. The protocol suggested by Ekert
(E91) [1] and that by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) [22]
are representative of the two sets respectively.
TABLE I: Deciders and mutual relations among the outcomes
in local measurements for pair-wise quantum key distribution
Alice Bob Charlie decider
z+ x+ x+ Alice
z+ x− x−
z− x+ or x− x+ or x−
x+ z+ x+ Bob
x− z+ x−
x+ or x− z− x+ or x−
x+ x+ z+ Charlie
x− x− z+
x+ or x− x+ or x− z−
In BB84, a sender encodes a key message on non-
orthogonal states of a quantum system (e.g., photon po-
larization) which is directly transferred to an authorized
person, a receiver. The receiver can retrieve the key mes-
sage by a measurement on the state if the measurement
is approved through classical communication with the
sender. Security of BB84 has been investigated based
on no cloning theorem [22, 23]. Modified protocols have
been proposed [24].
On the other hand, E91 utilizes an entangled EPR
pair as a quantum channel. Two distant persons share
an EPR pair. Each person measures an observable ran-
domly chosen among three non-commuting observables.
By doing so, the two persons can have in common a
key message if both measurements are approved through
classical communication. The procedures for encoding
and decoding are executed at the same time, contrary to
BB84. Security of E91 is based on Bell’s theorem [25]. As
the quantum channel is in an EPR state, the authorized
persons can see a violation of Bell’s inequality from mea-
surement outcomes. Provided an eavesdropper enforces
an intercept-resend strategy to extract the key message
[26], the attempt breaks the entanglement of the quan-
tum channel and thus the Bell’s inequality is not violated.
The link between security of QKD and Bell’s inequality
has been intensively discussed against individual attacks
by an eavesdropper [15].
Bennett et al. [27] suggested a slightly variant protocol
(BBM92) from E91 with a simplified set of observables
and showed that BBM92 is actually equivalent to BB84
although they have different characteristics on quantum
channels. They investigated the security by comparing
a priori probabilities with posteriori ones of outcomes
instead of Bell’s inequality.
We propose a pair-wise QKD protocol via W states of
three qubits, which is similar to BBM92 using EPR state
of two qubits. Suppose that three authorized persons,
Alice, Bob, and Charlie, would like to perform a secure
communication in the pair-wise way such that every pair
among the three persons tries to have a key message and
in particular the members in the pair have in common
the key message.
Consider a composite system of three qubits which is
3in a symmetric W state in Eq. (3). The three authorized
persons share the three qubits, one qubit for each per-
son. As in E91 or BBM92 they acquire key messages by
performing local measurements. Each person randomly
chooses an observable out of σˆz and σˆx. After his mea-
surement, he announces the axis but not the outcome.
When Alice measures along d1 axis, Bob along d2, and
Charlie along d3, the set of the axes is denoted by d1-d2-
d3. We employ particular sets of axes, i.e., x-x-z, x-z-x,
and z-x-x for the present pair-wise QKD. The probability
to choose one of the sets is 3/8.
In Table I, we present mutual relations among out-
comes when the authorized persons perform local mea-
surements along a particular set of axes. One who mea-
sured along z-axis decides whether it is possible for the
others to have in common a key message. We call him
a decider. For example, consider the case of x-x-z. If
Charlie obtains an outcome z− in his local measurement
along the z-axis, then Alice and Bob have their pair in
the product state |z+z+〉 and futher they obtain out-
comes randomly out of x+ and x− in their local mea-
surements along the x-axis. The outcomes are useless
for the present protocol and discarded as they exhibit no
correlation. However, if Charlie obtains z+, the pair that
Alice and Bob share comes to be in the maximally entan-
gled state (|z−z+〉 + |z+z−〉)/
√
2. In the measurements
along x-axis, Alice and Bob obtain the same outcome of
x+ or x−. They may now regard the outcome as a key
bit. Similar procedures are applied to the rest of x-z-x
and z-x-x. The success probability in distributing a key
bit is 2/3 once a particular set of measurement axes is
chosen among x-x-z, x-z-x, and z-x-x.
The present pair-wise QKD protocol via W states is
summarized as following
K.1 Each of Alice, Bob, and Charlie chooses, at ran-
dom, the axis of measuring instrument out of x-
and z-axes.
K.2 Each person announces a bit information on the
axis of his local measurement but not the outcome.
K.3 For the purpose of security one requests to an-
nounce their outcomes at random in the trials of
distributing key messages.
K.4a All keep their outcomes if the set of the measure-
ment axes is x-x-z, x-z-x, or z-x-x. Otherwise
restart the protocol.
K.4b A decider who measured along z-axis tells the rest
to regard their outcomes as a key bit if his outcome
is z+. Otherwise restart the protocol.
K.5 Repeat the protocol until they have key bits as
many as they want.
K.6 By obtaining frequencies of security-check events
over the outcomes which were announced at the
step K.3, verify the security of quantum channel
against attacks by an eavesdropper (See Sec. IV
for details). If the errors are larger than permitted,
throw away the key bits which have been obtained
so far.
Overall success probability Ps in obtaining a key bit is
given by multiplying together the probability of choos-
ing a particular set of measurement axes and the success
probability of distributing a key bit for a given particu-
lar set of axes. The number of distributed key bits Kt is
given as
Kt = PsNe (8)
where Ps is an overall success probability and Ne an ef-
fective number of trials. In the pair-wise QKD Ps = 1/4
and Ne = N −M where N is a number of total trials in
the protocol and M a number of trials for the purpose of
security. For a given Kt, the protocol requires nq qubits
such that
nq =
3Kt
Ps(1 +M/N)
. (9)
In the limit of N → ∞, M/N → 0 and nq → 3Kt/Ps.
Thus the protocol requires 12 qubits per a key bit at
average. On the other hand, the protocol of E91 has the
overall success probability Ps = 2/9 and it requires 9
qubits per a key bit.
B. Partial quantum secret sharing
Quantum secret sharing is a key distribution protocol
among N persons in such a way that one’s key message
can be retrieved by the others only if they cooperate all
together. Variant protocols have been proposed by using
multipartite GHZ states [13, 15] and bipartite EPR states
[28, 29].
Here we consider a partial quantum secret sharing pro-
tocol (PQSS) using W states of three qubits. The pro-
cedure for PQSS among three persons is similar to the
pair-wise QKD. The difference is the set of measurement
axes, i.e., z-z-z is employed.
Suppose Alice, Bob, and Charlie would like to perform
QSS by sharing three qubits in a symmetric W state (3).
Each person randomly chooses an observable out of σˆz
and σˆx as done in the pair-wise QKD. After his measure-
ment, he announces the axis but not the outcome. In
the case of z-z-z, he may regard the outcome as a key
bit. More explicitly, consider a case that Bob and Char-
lie are expected to retrieve Alice’s key message in their
cooperation. If Alice has the outcome z+, then Bob and
Charlie have opposite outcomes out of z+ and z−. Oth-
erwise Both have the same outcome z+. When Bob and
Charlie cooperate so as to collect their outcomes, they
can correctly deduct Alice’s key bit. We note that, if
Bob or Charlie obtains z−, he will realize that the other
and Alice have the same outcome z+. In the case he can
deduct Alice’s key bit without help of the other. It will
be done in the probability of 1/3. The fact implies that
4Bob and Charlie may have partial information on Alice’s
key bit. However, Bob and Charlie must still cooperate
to retrieve completely Alice’s key bits. In the sense we
call the present protocol a PQSS.
Although the actual key sharing is performed in the
case of z-z-z, the authorized persons must choose σˆx for
their observables as well for the purpose of security. If
they chose only z-axis for PQSS, an eavesdropper could
extract all information by measuring along z-axis.
The protocol of PQSS has steps in common with the
pair-wise QKD protocol: Most steps in the pair-wise
QKD protocol are applicable to PQSS but the step K.4
is modified as
S.4 All keep their outcomes if the set of the measure-
ment axes is z-z-z. Otherwise restart the protocol.
In PQSS we have the overall success probability Ps =
1/8 which is determined by the probability of choosing
z-z-z. Due to the arguments below Eq. (8), 24 qubits
are necessary to share a key bit at average in the limit
of N → ∞. On the other hand, HBB99 with Ps = 1/2
needs 6 qubits per a key bit.
C. Synthesis of QKD and PQSS
The proposed protocols for QKD and PQSS via W
states overlap the following procedures, a) performing
local measurements for an observable out of σˆz and σˆx
at random and b) checking security by obtaining frequen-
cies in security-check events. They differ in choosing a set
of measurement axes and their sets of axes are mutually
exclusive. This observation enables a synthesis protocol
by which both QKD and PQSS are performed simulta-
neously. That is, if authorized persons choose a set of
axes out of x-x-z, x-z-x, and z-x-x, their outcomes are
used for QKD and, if they choose z-z-z, their outcomes
are used for PQSS. We construct the synthesis protocol
by inserting a new step B.3′ between K.3 and K.4 in the
protocol of pair-wise QKD as
B.3′ If the set of the measurement axes is z-z-z, go to
the step S.4 and otherwise go to K.4.
In the synthesis protocol, the probability to perform
QKD is not equal to that for PQSS. Of successful trials
for QKD or PQSS, 2/3 and 1/3 are involved in QKD and
PQSS respectively. The overall success probability for
the synthesis protocol is obtained by summing those for
QKD and PQSS so that Ps = 3/8. Due to the arguments
below Eq. (8), in the limit of N → ∞, the necessary
number of qubits is nsynq = 8 per a key bit at average. In
order to compare the synthesis protocol, let us consider a
separate protocol performed by E91 for QKD and HBB99
for QSS in probabilities 2/3 and 1/3 respectively. The
necessary number of qubits is nsepq = 8, which is equal to
nsynq .
IV. SECURITY IN THE PROPOSED
PROTOCOLS
How is it guaranteed that the distributed key messages
are secure against attacks by an eavesdropper? An eaves-
dropper, Eve, may have several kinds of strategies to at-
tack [26]. A systematic method for security is not known
against all possible strategies. We shall consider simple
individual attacks such that Eve performs a unitary op-
eration on a composite system of her auxiliary qubit and
one of three qubits, which are involved in a secure com-
munciation, and she tries to extract some information
by measuring her auxiliary qubit [15, 26, 27]. We show
that authorized persons can detect these attacks as they
examine frequencies of their outcomes.
Suppose Eve tries to extract some information from a
qubit for Charlie. Preparing her qubit in the state |z+〉
for a simplicity and intercepting the qubit on the way for
Charlie, Eve applies to the composite system of her and
Charlie’s qubit a unitary operation of
UˆCE|z+z+〉CE = |z+z+〉CE
UˆCE|z−z+〉CE = cosφ|z−z+〉CE + sinφ|z+z−〉CE(10)
where φ ∈ [0, pi/2] characterizes the strength of Eve’s at-
tack. This unitary operation was considered to study the
optimal individual attack by Eve [30]. Due to eavesdrop-
ping, the four-qubit state of A, B, C, and E reads
|W ′〉 = 1√
3
(|z−z+z+z+〉+ |z+z−z+z+〉
+cosφ|z+z+z−z+〉+ sinφ|z+z+z+z−〉
)
.(11)
This state is no longer symmetric. The probabilities
given in Eqs. (4) to (7) come to vary with respect to
the observing persons. In particular P (zC = z+, x
A 6=
xB) 6= P (zA = z+, xB 6= xC) in Eq. (5).
It is clear that the trial of Eve’s eavesdropping changes
not only the state of quantum channel but also its proba-
bilities in Eqs. (4) to (7). For example, consider the event
that one person has the outcome zi = z+ and the others
have the opposite outcomes xj 6= xk once the authorized
persons choose one of x-x-z, x-z-x, and z-x-x for their
measurement axes. The probability of such an event to
occur vanishes as given in Eq. (5) if there is no eaves-
dropping. However, as Eve tries the individual attack,
the probabilty of such an event becomes (1− cos2 φ)/6 if
Charlie chooses z-axis and (1−cosφ)/3 if he does x-axis.
This implies that such an event is expected to occur in
the probability
P¯ =
(1− cosφ)(5 + cosφ)
18
(12)
which is obtained by averaging the probabilities over
Charlie’s two cases. Keeping it in mind that such an
event never happens if there is no attack by Eve, the
authorized persons can detect Eve’s eavesdropping by
checking whether such an event occurs. We call, by
5a security-check event, an event which can be used to
detect Eve’s eavesdropping. For the security of QKD,
PQSS, and the synthesis, we employ the event that one
person has the outcome zi = z+ and the others have the
opposite outcomes xj 6= xk. This security event has an
advantage over others such that they never occur if no at-
tack by Eve and their occurrence indicates directly Eve’s
attack.
Subensemble of local-measurement outcomes suffices
to examine the security of the proposed protocols. One
of three persons may request at random to announce their
outcomes byM times among N trials for distributing key
messages. We call M a number of security trials. Based
on M sets of outcomes, they obtain the frequency of the
security-check event and verify whether there is an attack
by Eve. This procedure is appended to the protocols as
steps K.3 and K.6.
V. REMARKS
We have proposed three variant protocols of quantum
key distribution, partial quantum secret sharing, and
their synthesis based on W states, which have the differ-
ent nonlocal characteristics from GHZ states. We have
shown that these protocols are secure against the simple
individual attacks by an eavesdropper.
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